반 수니파

Anti-Sunnism
Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim
이슬람에 관한 시리즈의 일부
수니파 이슬람
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수니파 법학파

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수니파 신학파

Ihsan에 대해서

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차별
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예언자 무함마드와 칼리프 아부 바크르, 칼리프 오마르가 묻혀 있는 사우디아라비아 메디나의 알 마스지드 안나바위는 수니파 이슬람에서 가장 신성한 장소 중 하나다.

반 수니파는 수니파 [1]이슬람교도들에 대한 증오, 편견, 차별, 박해, 폭력이다.

또한 "수니포비아"라고도 불리는데, 이는 "수니파와 수니파에 대한 두려움 또는 증오"[2]이다.

"와하비"라는 용어는 평신도 살라피 [3]이슬람교도들을 악마로 만드는 데 자주 사용되어 왔다.

테러와의 전쟁 수사

무함마드 이븐 압둘 와합은 18세기 [4]아라비아의 수니파 이슬람 개혁가였다.오스만 제국의 종교 성직자들은 그와 그의 지지자들을 이단자이며 [5]배교자로 여겼다.그들은 "와하비"라는 용어로 라벨이 붙여졌다.19세기 동안, 인도의 영국 식민지 정부는 상상된 "와하비 음모"[6][7]를 진압하기 위해 "위대한 와하비 재판"으로 알려진 반식민지 수니파 학자들을 재판에 회부했다.

러시아에서 [8][9]와하비가 되는 것은 공식적으로 범죄이다.러시아 연합 중앙아시아 독재정권에서는 "와하비"라는 용어가 허가받지 않은 종교활동을 지칭하는 데 사용된다.그 결과, 모더니스트든 보수든 정치적이든 비정치적이든 수니파 이슬람교도라면 누구나 잠재적 [10]표적이 될 수 있다.

9/11 세계무역센터 폭탄 테러에 대응하여,[11] 미국과 그 동맹국들은 테러와의 전쟁이라고 불리는 국제적인 규모의 전례 없는 대테러 노력을 하는 논란이 많은 정책을 시작했습니다.그것은 악명높은 단어들로 특징지어졌다. "당신은 우리와 함께 있거나 우리와 반대한다."[12]

테러와의 전쟁의 목적뿐만 아니라 이 접근법에도 [13][14]의문이 제기되었다.그것은 또한 [15][16]전 세계적으로 다양한 형태의 이슬람 공포증을 부추긴다는 비난을 받아왔다.

'테러와의 전쟁'이라는 미사여구는 다른 권위주의 [17]정권에서도 채택되고 있다.이스라엘, 러시아, 중국 등은 수니파 [18][19][20]이슬람교도들을 겨냥해 '와하비'라는 꼬리표를 자주 사용해 왔다.러시아는 제2차 체첸 전쟁, 북 코카서스 반란, [21]현재 시리아에서 벌어지고 있는 러시아 전쟁에서 그들만의 "테러와의 전쟁"을 사용했다.

종파적 반전으로 테러와의 전쟁 수사 또한 이슬람에 대한 호메인주의의 해석을 따르는 이란에[22][23] 의해 무기화되었고 심지어 미국과 자주 [24]긴밀히 협력하고 있다.이란 관리들은 보통 [25]이 지역에서 종파 정체성 정치를 촉진하기 위해 "와하비"라는 꼬리표를 사용한다.테러와의 전쟁 이전에도 아야톨라 호메이니와 라프산자니 같은 이란 지도자들은 수니파를 "이단자"라고 묘사하는 와하비라는 꼬리표를 인용하여 수니파 공포증과 이란의 [26][27]이슬람 혁명 수출 정책을 부추겼다.테러와의 전쟁 이후, 상상 속의 와하비 음모가 미국을 대체하여 이란의 위대한 [28]사탄으로 인식되었다.이는 유대인의 [29][30]뿌리로 '와하비즘(Wahhabism)'을 표방한 카셈 솔레이마니 전 IRGC 서장의 발언으로 더욱 드러났다.헤즈볼라의 하산 나스랄라 사무총장은 "와하비즘"을 "이스라엘보다 더 사악한 것"[31]이라고 불렀다.더욱 자극적인 어조로 자바드 자리프 이란 외무장관은 뉴욕타임스에 "와하비즘의 세계를 없애자"라는 제목의 논란의 여지가 있는 기사를 기고하면서 와하비즘을 "신학적 변태"로 묘사했고, "대혼란을 초래했고" 사실상 모든 테러 집단을 "와하비즘"[32][33][34]이라고 불렀다.

역사적 박해

사파비드 기간

주요 기사: 이란의 시아파로 개종한 사파비드

수니파 이슬람의 성장에 대응하여, 사파비 왕조는 많은 수니파를 죽이고, 그들을 시아파로 개종시키려고 시도했고, 수니파 성인들의 많은 매장들이 사파비드 샤에 의해 불태워졌고, 수니파 국가들도 [35][36]점령당했다.그들은 또한 수니파 [37][38]이슬람교도들의 처음 세 칼리프를 저주했다.

이스마일 1세는 이란과 그가 지배한 땅을 위해 새로운 법을 만들었다.

  • 시아파를 국가이자 전 국민을 위한 의무 종교로 강제하고 이란 수피 수니파를 [39][40][41]시아파로 강제 개종시켰다.
  • 그는 종교 기관과 기부를 감독하는 역할을 하는 사무처인 사드르(아랍어, 지도자)를 다시 도입했다.이란을 시아파 국가로 변모시키기 위해 사드르는 트웰버 [42]교리를 전파하는 임무도 부여받았다.
  • 그는 수니파 사원을 파괴했다.이는 1511년부터 1512년까지 이란을 방문한 주중 포르투갈 대사 토메 피레스에 의해 언급되기도 했는데, 그는 이스메일에 대해 언급하면서 다음과 같이 말했다: "그는 (이스마일) 우리 교회를 개혁하고 (무함마드의) 순나를 따르는 모든 무어인들의 집을 파괴한다.."[43]
  • 그는 수니파 칼리프 3명(아부 바크르, 우마르, 우스만)을 강탈하고 수니파 타리카를 해체하고 그들의 자산을 압류했으며, 시아파 사원과 기관, 종교 예술을 발전시키기 위해 국가 후원을 이용했으며, 수니파 [44][45][46]학자들을 대체하기 위해 시아파 학자들을 수입했다.
  • 그는 수니파를 죽이고 그들의 무덤과 모스크를 파괴하고 신성모독했다.이것은 오스만 술탄 바예지드 2세가 (처음 이스마일 승리를 축하하는) 젊은 군주에게 반(反) 수니파 행동을 중단하라고 충고하고 요청하게 만들었다.그러나 이스마일은 강한 반(反) 수니파였고, 술탄의 경고를 무시했으며,[47][48] 칼로 시아파 신앙을 계속 전파했다.
  • 그는 완강히 저항하는 수니파를 [49][50]박해하고, 투옥하고, 추방하고, 처형했다.
  • 사파비드 통치의 확립과 함께, 칼리프 오머의 암살을 축하하는 26일의 거의 카니발 같은 요란하고 다채로운 휴일이 있었다.그날의 하이라이트는 저주받고 모욕당하고 마침내 불태워지는 우마르의 형상을 만드는 것이었다.그러나 이란과 수니파 국가 간의 관계가 개선되면서, 그 휴일은 [51]더 이상 지켜지지 않게 되었다.
  • 1501년 이스마일은 이란 밖에 사는 모든 시아파를 이란으로 초청해 수니파 [52]다수파로부터 보호를 보장받았다.

근대 박해

이라크

주요 기사:이라크의 수니파 이슬람

2003년 이라크 침공 이후 수립된 이라크 정부는 수니파 수감자들을 종파적 [53]방식으로 학살하고 관료 정치 군 경찰 등에서 조직적인 차별을 가한 혐의를 받고 있다.이라크 내전 중 2006년 알 아스카리 사원 폭탄 테러 이후 수니파들이 많이 사망했다.

바르와나 대학살

주요 기사: 바르와나 대학살

이번 학살은 이슬람 수니파 마을 바르와나에서 시아파 무장세력에 의해 자행된 것으로 알려졌으며 70명의 소년과 [54]남성을 살해한 것으로 알려졌다.

헤이 알 지하드 학살

주요 기사:헤이 알 지하드 학살

2006년 7월 9일 이라크 수도 바그다드의 헤이 알-지하드 지역에서 약 40명의 수니파 민간인이 마흐디군의 [55]시아파 민병대에 의한 보복 공격으로 사망했다.

무사브 빈 우마이르 모스크 학살

주요 기사:무사브 빈 우마이르 모스크 학살

2014년 8월 22일 시아파 무장세력이 이라크 이맘와이스 마을의 수니파 무사브 이븐 우마이어 사원을 공격해 최소 73명을 숨지게 한 것으로 알려졌으며, 이 공격은 수니파 다수가 [56]예배에 참석하던 금요일 기도 도중 일어났으며, 공격 당시 이슬람 사원에는 150여명의 신도들이 있었다.그 무장세력은 나중에 무죄로 판명되었다.

미국

1973년 하나피 이슬람 학살

주요 기사 : 1973년 하나피 무슬림 학살

1973년 하나피 무슬림 대학살은 1973년 1월 18일 오후 어른 2명과 어린이 1명이 총에 맞아 사망한 사건이다.9살에서 10살 사이의 다른 4명의 아이들이 익사했다.다른 두 명은 중상을 입었다.살인은 하나피 무슬림 집단이 구입해 '하나피 아메리칸 무슬림 라이플 앤 피스톨 클럽'[57][58][59]이라는 이름을 붙인 워싱턴 D.C. 16번가 7700번지의 자택에서 발생했다.

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레퍼런스

  1. ^ John Richard Thackrah (5 September 2013). Dictionary of Terrorism (2, revised ed.). Routledge. p. 252. ISBN 978-1-135-16595-6.
  2. ^ "Meaning of Sunniphobia". Words Look.
  3. ^ "The Wahhabi Myth: Debunking the Bogeyman". Muslim Matters. April 1, 2007. Archived from the original on 29 November 2020.
  4. ^ "Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad (d. 1791)". Oxford Islamic Studies online. Archived from the original on 12 July 2016.
  5. ^ SAUDI ARABIA WAHHÂBÎSM & THE SALAFÎ SECT: UNDERSTANDING THE GREAT CONSPIRACY. Johannesburg, South Africa: Dar al Ahnaf. p. 81. "Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Sulaymân al-Madanî ash-Shâfi‘î, as quoted in the book ‘Ashadd ul-Jihâd’, declared his belief a heresy and formally excommunicated him by issuing a fatwâ, the text of which said: “ This man is leading the ignoramuses of the present age to a heretical path. He is attempting to extinguish Allah's light, but Allah will not permit His light to be extinguished.”
  6. ^ Stephens, Julia (January 5, 2009). "The "Great Wahabi Trial": The Legal Construction and Deconstruction of the Muslim Jihadi in British India, 1869–71". American Historical Association. Archived from the original on 5 October 2020.
  7. ^ Stephens, Julia (January 2013). "The Phantom Wahhabi: Liberalism and the Muslim fanatic in mid-Victorian India". Modern Asian Studies. 47 (1): 22–52. doi:10.1017/S0026749X12000649. JSTOR 23359778. S2CID 145092951 – via JSTOR. ABSTRACT In the late 1860s and early 1870s the British colonial government in India suppressed an imagined Wahhabi conspiracy, which it portrayed as a profound threat to imperial security.
  8. ^ "Совет муфтиев России выступил против запрета ваххабизма". 2 April 2018. Archived from the original on 5 April 2018.
  9. ^ "Attack on Wahhabi Islam divides Russian Muslims: COUNCIL OF MUFTIS OF RUSSIA SPEAKS OUT AGAINST BAN OF WAHHABISM - "While deeply aware of the vital importance of combating the ideology of intolerance and devoting great efforts in this direction, we nevertheless consider that the introduction of the principle of prosecution of believers for their convictions and not for specific illegal actions will have a most harmful effect both on the Muslim community of Russia and inter-ethnic harmony and on the legal culture of the Russia state," the statement of the Council of Muftis says, which was posted on Monday on its website". stetson.edu. Archived from the original on 26 January 2021.
  10. ^ Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London, New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. p. 192. In Russia and Central Asia, public figures and the media see Wahhabism as the inspiration for religious revival and Islamic political movements. During the Soviet era, official apprehensions emerged about an ‘Islamic threat’ posed by Sufi orders as nests of secret conspiracies against the communist system. In the post-Soviet era, Sufism has assumed a positive connotation as a moderate form of Islam opposed to Wahhabism, which has become a sort of bogeyman in public discourse. Pejorative use of the term cropped up in the late Soviet era, when members of the official religious establishment castigated proponents of expunging ritual of non-scriptural elements for ‘importing’ Wahhabism, thus implying that it is alien to the region’s heritage. Many Russians believe that after the Afghan war, Wahhabis infiltrated Central Asia to spread their version of Islam. Thus, in 1998, political leaders of Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan declared their readiness to confront ‘a threat of aggressive fundamentalism, aggressive extremism and above all Wahhabism. This is what we have currently in Afghanistan and in troubled Tajikistan.’ The government of Uzbekistan tags unsanctioned religious activity with the Wahhabi label. The problem with this outlook is that it conflates differences among a variety of Muslim religious movements, which include militant and reformist political tendencies alongside utterly apolitical ones. Thus, a leading Tajik modernist who favours a blend of democracy and Islam has been branded a Wahhabi even though he has ties to Sufi circles
  11. ^ H. Daddler , M Lindsay, Ivo , James (Dec 1, 2001). "Nasty, Brutish and Long: America's War on Terrorism". BROOKINGS. Archived from the original on 19 November 2020.
  12. ^ "'You are either with us or against us'". CNN. November 6, 2001. Archived from the original on 24 January 2016.
  13. ^ Odom, William (27 February 2014). "American Hegemony: How to Use It, How to Lose It" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 January 2016.
  14. ^ K Albright, Madeleine (June 2, 2009). "Obama's Muslim Speech "According to Muslim speakers at such events, one fact stands out: When the cold war ended, America needed an enemy to replace Communism and chose Islam...Mr. Obama's dilemma is that no speech, however eloquent, can disentangle U.S.-Muslim relations from the treacherous terrain of current events in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Middle East...Muslims desire respect and respect demands frankness. We cannot pretend that American soldiers and aircraft are not attacking Muslims."". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 19 July 2016.
  15. ^ A. Beydoun, Khalid (2020). "Exporting Islamophobia in the Global "War On Terror"" (PDF). NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE. Archived (PDF) from the original on 26 April 2020.
  16. ^ Carrington, Kerry; Ball, Matthew; O'Brien, Erin; Tall, Juan (2013). Crime, Justice and Social Democracy: International Perspectives. UK: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. pp. 133–144. doi:10.1057/9781137008695_9. ISBN 978-1-137-00868-8. Archived from the original on 27 March 2020. When, in September 2001, the right-wing Republican president of the US proclaimed the ‘war on terrorism’, which he also dubbed a ‘crusade’, George W. Bush was soon joined in such battle by his staunch British ally Tony Blair, a Labour prime minister. A populist prime minister of the conservative coalition in Australia, John Howard faithfully entered the fray on behalf of this nation, which likewise imagines itself to have a special relationship with the USA. All these allies participated in the unlawful invasion of Afghanistan the following month, in the name of this war on terrorism, and of Iraq eighteen months later. The forces of all three countries are still in Afghanistan, with very little difference to this fact having been made by the now Democratic presidency in the US, the now Tory-led coalition in the UK, or the now Labor government in Australia. Really, existing labour parties - when in government, that is - have taken a very similar stance in relation to securing militarily the US-led global empire to that of their conservative opponents. All have participated similarly in state crime in the ‘war on terror’; indeed all have been comparably complicit in what I call ‘empire crime’
  17. ^ A Beydoun, Khaled (2020). "EXPORTING ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE GLOBAL "WAR ON TERROR"". New York University Law Review Online. 95:81: 84. Beyond genuine national security threats, countries across the world capitalized on the conflation of Islam with terrorism to serve discrete national interests. This American War on Terror furnished nations with license, and more importantly, a policing template and language to profile and persecute their Muslim minority populations. American Islamophobia, buoyed by swift state action including the War in Afghanistan and the USA PATRIOT Act, manifested in a surge of vigilante violence against Muslims and “Muslim-looking” groups and had global impact
  18. ^ Delong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam:From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. New York: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. pp. 123–124. ISBN 0199883548. Many of the regimes and movements labeled as Wahhabi in the contemporary era do not necessarily share the same theological and legal orientations. The reality is that Wahhabism has become such a blanket term for any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and hadith that the designation of a regime or movement as Wahhabi or Wahhabi-like tells us little about its actual nature. Furthermore, these contemporary interpretations of Wahhabism do not nec- essarily reflect the writings or teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
  19. ^ Atkin, Muriel. "THE RHETORIC OF ISLAMOPHOBIA". CA&C Press AB. In political, as well as religious matters, any Muslim who challenges the status quo is at risk of being labeled a Wahhabi. This is how the KGB and its post-Soviet successors have used the term. In fact, the KGB may have played a large role in promoting its use
  20. ^ Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU: I.B TAURIS. p. 192. Pejorative use of the term cropped up in the late Soviet era, when members of the official religious establishment castigated proponents of expunging ritual of non-scriptural elements for ‘importing’ Wahhabism, thus implying that it is alien to the region’s heritage.Many Russians believe that after the Afghan war, Wahhabis infiltrated Central Asia to spread their version of Islam. Thus, in 1998, political leaders of Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan declared their readiness to confront ‘a threat of aggressive fundamentalism, aggressive extremism and above all Wahhabism. This is what we have currently in Afghanistan and in troubled Tajikistan. The government of Uzbekistan tags unsanctioned religious activity with the Wahhabi label. The problem with this outlook is that it conflates differences among a variety of Muslim religious movements, which include militant and reformist political tendencies alongside utterly apolitical ones. Thus, a leading Tajik modernist who favours a blend of democracy and Islam has been branded a Wahhabi even though he has ties to Sufi circles.{{cite book}}: CS1 유지보수: 위치(링크)
  21. ^ Shuster, Simon (September 19, 2011). "How the War on Terrorism Did Russia a Favor". TIME.
  22. ^ Zammit, Wael (30 August 2015). "US–Iran "Special" Relations Between 2001 and 2003: Friends or Foes? "The "war on terror" created a rare opportunity for Iran and U.S. to come together". E-International Relations. p. 14. Archived from the original on 20 April 2017. In one of their meetings, the member of the Iranian delegation had a message for the American government: “Iran was prepared to work unconditionally with the United States in the “war on terror” and if they could work with [the Americans] on this issue, it had the potential to fundamentally transform U.S.-Iranian relations.” Commenting on this, reporter John Richardson said that such a statement had “seismic diplomatic implications" ... " In Tehran, the Iranians opted for rapprochement as they wanted to ensure that the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan could succeed, and they had their own reasons. Infact, the American decision to destroy the infrastructure of al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban served major political,economic and strategic goals for Tehran" .. "To eliminate the Taliban regime would also mean to put an end to the support the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) received from Iran’s enemies and neighbors: Afghanistan and Sadam’s Iraq. Last but not least, Iran wanted to play an active role in the “war on terror;” reduce tension and improve relations with Western countries including the United States and assure Tehran’s full integration in the international community." Pg.15 "The “war on terror” created a rare opportunity for Iran and U.S. to come together. Hilary Mann,who had just joined the National Security Council staff as its resident Iran expert and Ryan Crocker, a senior State Department official, sit with Iranian officials who expressed their will to cooperate with the Americans and re-establish diplomatic relations." Pg.16 "I an interview with Barbara Slavin in 2005, former Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps’ chief commander, Mohsen Rezaie, stated that the Islamic Republic played an “important role” in capturing Kabul as members of IRGC “fought alongside and advised the Afghan rebels who helped U.S. forces topple Afghanistan’s Taliban regime” in the months after the September 11 terrorist attacks.Such a stance is further emphasized by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who discussed the war on Afghanistan on CBS in November 11, 2001, two days before the fall of Kabul and asserted that “there [were] some Iranian liaison people, as well as some American liaison people working with the same Afghan forces.”Besides, Slavin confirms the Iranian role and argues that members of the IRG Qods Brigade were on the field when the Alliance, with U.S. air support, took control of Kabul."... "The American-Iranian cooperation did not end after the successful overthrow of the Taliban regime. The rapprochement between the two arch-foes was further illustrated in their collaboration to create an interim post-Taliban government in Afghanistan. Whereas, Iran’s role in the “war on terror” was largely secret, its role in forming a “broad-based, multiethnic, politically balanced, freely chosen” government was rather direct as the American and Iranian diplomats met and collaborated via the Six plus Two group.
  23. ^ Sebnem Oruc, Merve (25 February 2020). "How did the world buy Assad's 'war on terror' narrative?". Daily Sabah. p. While the Assad regime and its most loyal backer Iran provided an opportunity for the rise of al-Qaida and Daesh in Syria, Damascus also allowed the radicals to travel abroad freely to confuse the Westerners. The extremists went abroad and recruited sympathizers, brought them to Syria for training and then sent them back. Assad’s clerics had already threatened the West; they kept their promise and made Daesh bombings happen in the Western countries. It was a “shock and awe” tactic that actually worked. The Western leaders who were against Assad’s rule became the targets of far-right and leftist political groups in Europe. And finally, Islamophobia – Sunniphobia is the right word actually – started to rise in the West as every Sunni was seen as a threat by the white supremacists and their circles of influence.
  24. ^ N. Katz, Mark. "Iran and the "War on Terror"". Middle East Policy Council.
  25. ^ Ostovar, Afshon (30 November 2016). "Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics Collide". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Archived from the original on 25 April 2018. However, by equating takfirism and Wahhabism, Iran further muddies the water of identity politics. It is a way of confusing the sectarian dynamic in Iraq and Syria, by asserting that the other side is not actually Sunni, but rather an extreme ideological movement (takfirism) that is beyond the pale of Islam and, therefore, not even Islamic. Like the case of the Saudi grand mufti, such rhetoric allows Iranian officials to indulge in their own game of takfir—articulating who is and who is not a Muslim and justifying actions accordingly. To neutral observers of Wahhabism, such accusations might touch on truth, but as a foreign policy tool, they only beget further acrimony from Iran’s Sunni neighbors.
  26. ^ Kramer, Martin. "Khomeini's Messengers in Mecca". MartinKramer.org. Khomeini declared that the Saudi rulers, “these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back,” and announced that Mecca was in the hands of “a band of heretics.”32 Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, called “Wahhabi hooligans.” Rafsanjani recalled the nineteenth-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi‘ites) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi‘ites), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi‘ite works). The Wahhabis “will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history.”33 This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds."
  27. ^ Rabinovich, Itamar; Shaked, Haim, eds. (1989). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. XI 1987. Boulder, San Francisco, London: Westview Press. p. 174. ISBN 0-8133-0925-5. Iranian statements pandered to the belief still held by Shi‘ites that the fanatic Saudis were driven by their own misguided beliefs to kill innocent Shi‘ite pilgrims. Khomeini declared that the Saudi rulers, “these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back,” and announced that Mecca was in the hands of “a band of heretics.”Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, called “Wahhabi hooligans.” Rafsanjani recalled the nineteenth-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi‘ites) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi‘ites), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi‘ite works). The Wahhabis “will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history.”This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds.
  28. ^ Anas, Omair (September 17, 2016). "Iran's new Great Satan: Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabi ideology". FirstPost.
  29. ^ "Soleimani: Wahhabism Has Jewish Roots". Iran International. 23 February 2019.
  30. ^ J. Frantzman, Seth (February 22, 2019). "IRGC General Soleimani says roots of Wahhabism are Jewish, linked to ISIS". The Jerusalem Post.
  31. ^ Williams, Jennifer (27 September 2016). "The head of Hezbollah has found someone he hates even more than Israelis". Vox. "Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of a group that has been fighting Israel for decades, declared on Tuesday that “Wahhabism is more evil than Israel,” Lebanon’s Al Akhbar newspaper reported."... "In other words, things have gotten so bad that Hezbollah, Israel’s mortal enemy, now considers Wahhabis — that is, fellow Muslims — to be worse than Israel. Bear in mind, this is coming from the same man who has described Israel as “a cancerous entity and the root of all the crises and wars” and pledged that Israel’s destiny “is manifested in our motto: 'Death to Israel.’”{{cite news}}: CS1 maint :url-status (링크)
  32. ^ Javad Zarif, Mohammad (13 September 2016). "Mohammad Javad Zarif: Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 9 November 2020. Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, militant Wahhabism has undergone a series of face-lifts, but underneath, the ideology remains the same — whether it’s the Taliban, the various incarnations of Al Qaeda or the so-called Islamic State, which is neither Islamic nor a state."...... "Over the past three decades, Riyadh has spent tens of billions of dollars exporting Wahhabism through thousands of mosques and madrasas across the world. From Asia to Africa, from Europe to the Americas, this theological perversion has wrought havoc. As one former extremist in Kosovo told The Times, “The Saudis completely changed Islam here with their money." Though it has attracted only a minute proportion of Muslims, Wahhabism has been devastating in its impact. Virtually every terrorist group abusing the name of Islam — from Al Qaeda and its offshoots in Syria to Boko Haram in Nigeria — has been inspired by this death cult.
  33. ^ OSTOVAR, AFSHON PAPER Source: Getty Summary (30 November 2016). "Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics Collide". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Archived from the original on 9 August 2019. In September, the New York Times published an op-ed by Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, entitled “Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism.”Zarif contends that Wahhabist Islam has become a plague, unleashing terrorism and murderous tumult across the Middle East and throughout the world. He calls Wahhabism a “theological perversion” that has “wrought havoc” and had a “devastating” impact in Islamic communities. The violence committed by jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda is a direct result of “Riyadh’s persistent sponsorship of extremism,” he argues, and this violence is at the root of the current conflicts in the Middle East. He accuses Saudi Arabia of “playing the ‘Iran card’” to induce its allies to take part in the Syrian and Yemeni wars, and he concludes that “concrete action against extremism is needed.” Even though Riyadh caused the mess, Zarif “invite[s]” Saudi Arabia to be part of the solution. That gesture rings hollow given the accusatory tone of the piece. It is clearly a polemic against Iran’s neighbor and archrival, another salvo in their ongoing cold war.
  34. ^ El-Bar, Karim (5 October 2016). "Analysts slam Iran's Zarif for blasting Wahhabism but ignoring own record". Middle East Eye. Archived from the original on 30 May 2020.
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