화이군

Huai Army
화이군
淮軍
활동적인1862–1894
나라대청
유형준민간 민병대
닉네임안후이군
장비전통 무기와 현대 무기의 혼합(19세기)
계약타이핑 반란, 중일 전쟁, 제1차 중일 전쟁
지휘관
주목할 만한
지휘관들
리홍장

이군(중국어: 淮軍; 핀인:화이강의 이름을 딴 화이준(華á)은 1862년 타이핑 반란을 진압하기 위해 길러진 청나라와 연합한 군사였다.안후이 지방에 근거지를 두고 있었기 때문에 안후이군이라고도 불렸다.청나라의 안정을 회복하는 데 도움이 되었다.화이군은 전통적인 청의 그린 스탠더드 군단이나 팔기군과 달리 제도적 충성보다는 개인적인 충성심을 바탕으로 한 민병대였다.전통 무기와 현대 무기가 뒤섞여 무장하고 있었다.1861년 10월 샹군의 지휘관 리홍장은 화이군을 창설하였다.쩡궈판샹군을 계승했다.화이군 자체가 19세기 후반에 창설된 신군부배양군에 의해 계승되었다.

창간

쩡궈판은 1861년 말 안칭(安慶)을 회복하기 전에 제자인 리홍짱(李洪z)에게 명하여 샹군 일부를 리홍장의 모국인 안후이(安熙)로 다시 데려와 군무를 수행하고 리홍장의 지휘 아래 독립군을 조직하도록 하였다.그들의 총력은 항복한 안칭(安慶)의 일부 타이핑(太平) 병사들을 포함해 2만5000명이었다.리는 이들 병력을 한 부대로 통합하여 3개월간의 훈련 끝에 첫 전투인 상하이 전투(1861년)를 치렀다.

리홍장은 니안 반란 이후 중국에 유입된 용잉으로 알려진 새로운 지역군의 일부였던 화이군을 총지휘했다.만주팔기군이나 녹색표준군과는 달리 이들 지역군의 장교들은 순환되지 않고 자기 휘하에 있는 병사들을 골라 그들과 가부장적 관계를 맺었다.이들 군대는 현대식 무기를 갖추고 있었다.[1]

역사

화이군 사단 제복

차롄피아오(자롄비아오)와 같은 안웨이군 장교들도 독일에서 서양 군사훈련을 공부했다.[2]

저우성촨 장군은 안후이군 최고 부대 중 하나인 즈흘리(Zhihli)의 툰링/통통(통장)이었다.그는 리홍짱에게 현대식 외국 무기의 구매를 장려했다.[3]안웨이군의 온정주의와 군인과 장교들 사이의 관계는 장군으로부터 찬사를 받았다.부대에서도 족벌주의를 실천한 저우.[4]

서방의 군사 훈련은 저우(周)에 의해 실시되었는데, 장교들이 참가하도록 장려되었다.상벌과 벌칙은 각각 좋은 징표법과 나쁜 징표법에 대해 시행되었으며, '공로악화'와 돈이 주어졌다.[5]

저우는 의학, 전신, 철도 등 현대기술에 관심이 매우 높았는데, 찰스 고든 영국 고문이 이를 전쟁에 광범위하게 사용하는 것을 고려하지 않았다고 비판했다.리홍장의 독일어 교관들은 밤 시간에 엎드린 사격과 전투에 대한 지식이 부족하다는 이유로 저우로부터 비난을 받았다.서양인들과 일본인들은 그의 군대를 칭찬했고, 그들은 "일류"로 여겨졌다.저우는 '황혼의 공기'가 20년 만에 그 세력에 정착했고, 그 성능이 떨어졌다고 말했다.[6]

안웨이 군대의 비임관 장교들은 "특별한 훈련"[7]을 받았다.

리홍장은 안후이군 출신 장교들에게 지흘리 그린 스탠더드 군대의 고위 장교직을 수여했다.[8]

안후이군 부대는 중불전쟁 때 톤킨과 포모사에서 프랑스군과 맞서 복무했다.간혹 승리가 있긴 했지만 교전 중인 전투에서는 대부분 패했다.[9]

안후이 군은 정부에 의해 지흘리, 산시, 후베이, 장쑤, 산시 등 중국 전역의 여러 지방에 총 4만5000여 명이 주둔하고 있었다.그들은 또한 제1차 중일 전쟁에도 참전했다.[10]

안웨이군에 대한 류밍촨 장군의 통솔력은 대만에 전투 중인 프랑스군과 중국군을 대적할 수 있게 했다.[11]

프랑스군이 대만의 킬룽 요새를 점령하고 탐수이 부근에서 공격을 시도하자 류 장군 휘하의 안웨이 군인들에게 반격을 당했다.[12]

화이군 장교들은 대부분 공식 학위와 직함을 갖추지 못했는데, 이는 근대화가 중공군에 도입된 이후 학자들보다 더 많은 평민들이 병역에 입대하기 시작했기 때문이다.[13]

장교들

주요리더

2차 리더

참조

  1. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 202. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. By the end of the Nien War in 1868, a new kind of military force had emerged as the Ch'ing dynasty's chief bulwark of security. Often referred to by historians as regional armies, these forces were generally described at the time as yung-ying (lit. "brave battalions"). In the 1860s such forces throughout all the empire totaled more than 300,000 men, They included the remnants of the old Hunan Army (Hsiang-chün) founded by Tseng Kuo-fan, the resuscitated Hunan Army (usually called Ch'u-chün) under Tso Tsung-t'ang, and the Anhwei Army (Huai-chün) coordinated by Li Hung-chang. There were also smaller forces of a similar nature in Honan (Yü-chün), Shantung, (Tung-chün), Yunnan (Tien-chün) and Szechwan (Ch'uan-chün). These forces were distinguished generally by their greater use of Western weapons and they were more costly to maintain. More fundamentally they capitalized for military purposes on the particularistic loyalties of the traditional society. Both the strength and the weakness of the yung-ying were to be found in the close personal bonds that were formed between the higher and lower officers and between officers and men. In this respect they differed from the traditional Ch'ing imperial armies--both the banner forces and the Green Standard Army.
  2. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 245. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. Ch'a Lien-piao, one of several Anhwei Army officers whom Li had sent to Germany for training during the 1870s, received Chou's special praise for expertise in Western drill.
  3. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 244. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. Li seems to have left the training of the Anhwei Army troops to two or three high commanders (t'ung-ling) in Chihli, among whom Chou Sheng-ch'uan (1833-85) was the most energetic and conscientious. A veteran of the Taiping and Nien wars, Chou in the 1870s commanded the best-equipped detachment of the Anhwei Army, with usually more than 10,000 men under him. Like Li, Chou placed great emphasis on modern weapons. Quite knowledgeable about them, he repeatedly recommended that Li purchase Krupp cannon, Remington, Snyder and other modern rifles, Gatling guns and the like. His petitions to Li and instructions to his own troops indicate his awareness of the need not only to acquire and to keep in good condition new Western weapons, but also to provide systematic training in their use.
  4. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 246. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. Chou lauded the paternalism and interpersonal rapport that characterized the Anhwei Army--in fact, he had staffed his detachment with many of his own relatives. Although he himself greatly admired the skill and knowledge of foreign-educated officers such as Ch'a Lien-piao, Chou seldom recommended them for the Green Standard titles and offices so coveted by the yung-ying officers.
  5. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 245. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. Unlike some other yung-ying commanders, Chou was also convinced of the advantages of Western-style instruction and drill. He not only produced manuals, but often personally supervised the drill of his troops and continually exhorted his battalion and company officers to take part in it, too. Money rewards and 'badges of merit' (kung-p'ai) were recommended for superior marksmanship ; poor performance was punished.
  6. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 245. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. Although Chou did not want to employ Western instructors for his force, he often solicited foreign advice. Yet he reacted defensively, at times defiantly, to foreign criticism. He was skeptical, for example, of much of Gordon's military advice when the Victorian hero returned to China during the Ili crisis of 1880, and he even took to task the German officers that Li employed in the 1880s for knowing too little of night fighting and the advantages of prone firing. At times Chou clearly misunderstood the point of foreign advice--for example, when he characterized Gordon's advocacy of mobile, guerrilla-like tactics as laughable. Yet his charge that Gordon underestimated the importance of sophisticated technology seems fair enough. Chou, like Li, had a sustained interest in applied sciences (especially medicine) and modern means of communication, including the telegraph and railway. At least by contemporary Chinese standards, the battalions under Chou's command constituted a first-rate force. Japanese, German, British and American accounts of his troops are basically favorable. Yet several times during the early 1880s Chou himself remarked that the force had declined, that after 20 years it had lost its sharpness and acquired a 'twilight air'. The problem lay not so much in equipment as in the yung-ying system for the selection and promotion of officers. The experienced officers, Chou complained, lacked vigour, while the new ones lacked knowledge. Although Chou repeatedly admonished his battalion and company officers to participate in drill as strenuously as their troops, the officers continued to resist such involvement. It was, they felt, degrading. Chou's own writings as well as independent foreign observations note this crucial
  7. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 541. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. In 1853 Tseng Kuo-fan introduced special training for the non-commissioned officers of his new Hunan Army, emphasizing endurance and discipline. This was later imitated by the Anhwei Army. The technical training of the officer corps along western lines was begun in 1852 at Shanghai and Ningpo, where a few company commanders and their men were trained in the use of Western equipment and tactics by French and English military advisers.
  8. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 244. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. Soon after arriving in Chihli in 1870, Li began to integrate Chihli's Western-trained military forces into his own military organization, hopeful of putting these local resources to more effective use. He began with the 6,000 or so Green Standard lien-chün troops of the province, attempting to provide them with the same kind of drill and instruction as were available to his own men. He also secured the appointment of Anhwei Army commanders as high officers of the province's Green Standard system, in each case with Peking's approval. Ch'ung-hou's foreign arms and cannon corps, which Li inherited, was given retraining. Li refortified Taku and built a strategic walled city fronting the river ten miles form the estuary. He also expanded the Tientsin Arsenal, having been allocated funds for the purpose from the Tientsin maritime customs.107
  9. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 244. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. During the Sino-French War on 1884-1885, the Anhwei Army fought in both Tongking and Taiwan, and in the conflict with Japan in 1894-5, Li's troops saw action on every major front.
  10. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 244. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. By 1871, the Anhwei Army numbered nearly 45,000 troops, of which 13,500 were stationed in Chihli. The rest were located, as directed by the throne, in Shansi (3,000), Hupei (3,500), Kiangsu (4,500) and Shensi (20,000). In subsequent years, Li's troops continued to serve as the major defence force not only in Chihli, but also in several other provinces, in each case under the control of the top official of the province. During the Sino-French War on 1884-5, the Anhwei Army fought in both Tongking and Taiwan, and in the conflict with Japan in 1894-5, Li's troops saw action on every major front.
  11. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 252. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. Only on Taiwan were Chinese forces able to hold their own man-for-man against the French, thanks largely to the astute preparations by Liu Ming-ch'uan and the tactical ability of a few Anhwei Army officers.
  12. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 251. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. In early August, forces directed by Liu Ming-ch'uan, the famous Anhwei Army commander, repulsed an assault by Admiral Lespès aimed at the Keelung forts on Taiwan, and in October the French suffered another serious setback near Tamsui.
  13. ^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, eds. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Vol. 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 540. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. the cases of Hunan particulartly illustrates this widespread militarization of the scholar class. . .Such was also the case of Liu Ming-ch'uan who rose form smuggling salt to leading an army in Anhwei, and finally to the governorship of the province of Taiwan (see chapter 4). . . Until 1856 most of the officers of the Hunan Army were scholars, The proportion dropped sharply for commissions given after this date. . . Holders of official titles and degrees accounted for only 12 per cent of the military command of the Huai Army, and at most a third of the core of the Huai clique, that is the top commanders of the eleven army corps.